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Abstract_______________________________________________________________ 
 
Europe provides a suitable scenario for testing regularities of growth since its countries 
share to a large extent institutions, policies, and resource endowments. Patterns of 
development, that associate structural change to variations in GDP per head and 
population, are constructed for Europe in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries 
along the lines of Chenery and Syrquin (1975) pathbreaking work. Thus, it is possible to 
discern whether a common set of development processes is observable for the whole 
continent and whether countries which had a late start exhibited, as posited by 
Gerschenkron (1962), a differential behaviour in terms of accumulation, resource 
allocation, and demographic transition. The results tend to confirm the different nature 
of latecomers’ development. 
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The search for an optimal path of development, usually associated to the German 
Historical School, goes back to the Classical economists and can be traced back to the 
philosophers of the Enlightenment 1. A stage approach to historical development was 
suggested by Adam Smith, and Karl Marx quoted twice Horace's verses to emphasise 
the extent to which Britain's industrialising experience forecasted the future of 
Germany, by then, a late comer2. In the post-World War II years economists became 
once more interested in long-term growth and turned to history searching for a 
laboratory of natural experiments3. Stylised facts, short-cuts towards the optimal path of 
development were explored during the Golden Age (1950-73) by a generation of 
applied, historically minded economists.4 One of their achievements was the 
construction of patterns of development that rely on theoretical findings but lack an a 
priori model and, in the Clark/Kuznets tradition, are rooted in stylised facts.5 It is here, 
where economic theorising does not provide an explanation that the contribution of 
economic history is more needed.  
Modern Europe provides a sound basis for testing empirical regularities of 
growth as it offers a consistent and homogeneous set of countries which, to some extent, 
have shared resource endowments, institutions, and economic policies. Nonetheless, the 
map of Europe over the last two centuries shows, as Gerschenkron (1962, p. 353) 
expressively put it, ‘a motley picture of countries varying with regard to the degree of 
their backwardness’ and these initial differences have been ‘of crucial significance for 
the nature of subsequent development’ as economic structure, institutions, and ideologies 
all vary directly with them.6  
In this paper it is my purpose to put the existence of a common path of 
development in modern Europe to the test with the help of the stylised patterns of 
structural change designed by Chenery and Syrquin (1975). However, Gerschenkron’s 
(1962) emphasis on the fact that countries which had a late start would follow a 
different path of development with respect to early starters will be taken on board. The 
divergence between early starters and late comers originates in their structure of 
production, that results, in turn, from different institutions that substituted for the 
                                                 
1 Cf. O'Brien (1975); Meier and Baldwin (1957), Schumpeter (1954). 
2 Smith (1776); Marx (1867). Marx (1867, I, preface) writes, ‘the industrially more developed country 
presents to the less developed country a picture of the latter’s future’. 
3 Cf.  McCloskey (1981). 
4 Clark (1940), Lewis (1954), Solow (1956, 1957), Gerschenkron (1962), Kuznets (1956/67, 1966, 1971), 
Chenery (1960, 1968, 1975), Rostow (1960), Denison (1962, 1967), pioneered a positive approach to the 
determinants of economic development. 
5 That is, ‘income -related changes for which the available evidence suggests considerable uniformity but 
for which there is yet no well defined body of theory’ (Chenery and Syrquin, 1975, p. 6). 
6 We cannot presume, therefore, that European nations went throughout similar stages of development á 
la Rostow (1960). Cf. the path breaking work of Patrick O’Brien and Çaglar Keyder (1978). 
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missing pre-requisites of the first wave of industrialization. 7 The existence of distinctive 
development patterns for different epochs in Modern European history, such as the 
liberal era prior to World War I, the neo-mercantilist Interwar Years, and the post-
World War II return to liberalism, will be, therefore, investigated, and by widening the 
scope of the paper to include both the nineteenth and the twentieth century 
Gerschenkron's qualifications about the distinctive paths of development followed by 
early starters and latecomers will be revisited.8 It is worth stressing that the historical 
approach in a relatively homogenous region, such as Europe, that combines cross-
section and time series data provides a superior choice to the usual cross-section 
analysis for the recent past, in which low income countries are associated to early 
phases of development regardless (over-time and cross-country) differences in 
preferences and tastes.9  
 
A Chenery and Syrquin Approach to European Development Patterns  
Modern economic development is seen as an identifiable process of growth and 
change whose main features are the same across countries (Solow 1977, p. 491)10 and  
can be defined as ‘an interrelated set of long-run processes of structural transformation 
that accompany growth’ (Syrquin 1988, p. 205).11 A structural transformation consists 
of a set of changes in the composition of demand, production, trade, and employment, 
each reflecting different aspects of shifts in resource allocation that takes place as 
income levels rise. Thus, a development pattern may be defined as any systematic 
variation in the economic and social structure associated to a rising level of per capita 
income. Structural changes interact with the pattern of productivity growth in a general 
equilibrium system to determine the rate and pace of growth (Syrquin 1986, pp. 436-
37). 
                                                 
7 As Chenery (1975, p. 458) pointed, ‘late comers are different.. [the difference] stems from the existence 
of the  advanced countries as a source of technology, capital and manufactured imports, as well as 
markets for exports’. 
8 The paper follows the lead established two decades ago by Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris 
(1984) and Nick Crafts (1984) to cover earlier epochs than the statistically convenient late twentieth 
century world, usually neglected by development economists. Crafts (1984, p. 449) already perceived in 
Nineteenth Century Europe Gerschenkronian ‘tendencies towards a different kind of structural change in 
the later developing countries’.  
9 Cf. Branson, Guerrero, and Gunter (1998) for the latest substantive addition to this literature. 
10 The rationale for this approach, as exposed by Kuznets (1959, p. 170), ‘is conditioned on the existence 
of common, transnational factors, and a mechanism of interaction among nations that will produce some 
systematic order in the way modern economic growth can be expected to spread around the world’. 
11 A more comprehensive definition of economic development has been put forward by Adelman and 
Morris (1984, p. 46) as ‘the process of institutional transformation by which structural change is achieved 
and gains and losses are distributed’. 
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In the patterns of development framework, each country is treated as an 
integrated, interdependent component of the international economy. Such an assumption 
is only acceptable in Modern Europe after mid-nineteenth century, once the basis of the 
liberal international order was established. By then, however, more than three centuries 
of mercantilism, warfare and experience with internal and imperial markets had placed 
the countries of Europe at rather diverse levels of development. 
The patterns of development approach has been subjected to systematic 
criticism12. It has been argued that Chenery-Syrquin equations derive from an 
unspecified model of development in which we cannot tell supply from demand 
determinants. Moreover, development patterns do not reveal a unique path to 
industrialisation since comparative advantage, policy and institutions matter. A 
country's trade and production patterns, as Bhagwati (1977, p. 491) reminded us, are 
‘the result of an interaction between the country's own endowments and demands and 
the rest-of-the-world's endowments and demands’, a fact apparently not accounted for 
in the Chenery patterns. The challenge, therefore, would be, instead, to assess ‘the 
ability of an economy to reach its full potential, that is, to come close to optimal growth’ 
(Williamson 1986). Another line of criticism relates to the econometric approach as 
causality may run in either direction: from the level of per capita income to the 
structural variable or vice-versa (Branson et al. 1998). 
In the development patterns, however, there is no implication that a single 
unique path, through which all economies have to pass, have to exist. On the contrary, 
Chenery and his associates were always aware that, by treating development within a 
uniform framework, systematic differences in development patterns among nations 
would be identified.13 In fact, they distinguish between two components of a country's 
pattern of development: the normal effect of universal factors (that accounts for most of 
the observed structural variation among countries) and the effects of a country's 
individual history (that can be more readily evaluated after allowing for the uniform 
elements in each development pattern) (Chenery and Syrquin (1975, p. 5). 
Nonetheless, the only feasible way to approach historical reality, as 
Gerschenkron (1962) wrote, is through the search for certain regularities or 
uniformities, and the analysis of deviations to the norm. Since development occurs with 
sufficient uniformity among countries to produce a consistent pattern of change in 
                                                 
12 Cf. for instance, Díaz Alejandro (1976) and Perkins (1981). Williamson (1986) wrote, “in uncritical 
moments we tend to gauge an economy’s performance by its ability to replicate or even exceed those 
stylized patterns”. 
13 As Chenery (1988, p. 60) put it, “the search for uniform features of development almost inevitably 
leads to a division of countries into more homogeneous groups”. 
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resource allocation, factor use, and other structural features as the level of per capita 
income rises, a set of basic processes only restricted by the lack of empirical evidence 
has been selected14. All variables are expressed as shares (of GDP, total employment, 
etc.) since it is the relative variation which determines structural change. Shares are 
calculated at nominal prices since the decisions of individuals and firms are more 
meaningfully analysed at current, rather than at constant, prices. The development 
processes studied can be divided into three main categories: a) accumulation, that deals 
with the resources used to increase an economy's productive capacity, for which we 
have gathered information on stocks (literacy) and on increases in stocks (gross 
domestic investment and school enrolment); b) resource allocation, which interacting 
with accumulation, produces systematic changes in the composition of domestic 
demand, foreign trade, production, and employment, as real product per head rises15 ; c) 
demographic transition. Here they are summarized: 
1. Domestic Demand (percentage of GDP): gross domestic investment, private 
consumption, and government consumption. 
2. Education: primary and secondary school enrolment (percentage of population aged 5 
to 19) and literacy (percentage of population over 7 years old). 
3. Output Structure (percentage of GDP): value added in agriculture, industry (including 
mining, construction and utilities), and services. 
4. Labour Allocation (percentage of total labour force): labour force in agriculture, 
industry, and services. 
5. Foreign Trade (percentage of GDP): exports, imports, openness (exports plus 
imports), primary exports, manufactured exports. 
6. Urbanization (percentage of population in towns over 20,000 inhabitants). 
7. Demographic transition: crude birth and death rates (per thousand inhabitants), gross 
fertility (children per woman), infant mortality (per thousand births), net fertility16. 
Data on structural change across Europe have been gathered mostly from 
national sources, in particular, from reconstructed national accounts (see Appendix on 
sources) for three year averages around years ending in 0 up to 1900; then, for 
significant benchmarks in the Interwar period (1913, 1925, 1929, 1933, 1938) and for 
years ending in 0 and 5 over 1950-90. A major feature of the data set is that non-market 
economies have been excluded given the conceptual and data problems involved 
                                                 
14 Chenery and Syrquin (1975, p. 11). In a next version of the paper additional structural variables 
(financial, monetary, and social) will be added. 
15As Chenery and Syrquin (1975, p. 33) put it, “theses patterns result from the interaction between the 
demand effects of rising income and the supply effect of changes in factor proportions and technology”. 
16 Net fertility = (1 - infant mortality rate) ?  gross fertility. 
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(different economic categories, low reliability, and, especially, a different set of 
incentives for economic agents). 
GDP per head is expressed here in 1990 U.S. dollars (converted at the Geary-
Khamis purchasing power parity) and countries’ series have been built by projecting 
backwards 1990 levels (calculated at international prices) with each country growth 
rates (estimated at national prices) and, regrettably, the resulting series suffer from a 
serious index number problem since their economic meaning weakens as we move away 
from the 1990 benchmark (Prados de la Escosura 2000).  
 
Methodology 
In this section the econometric methods used for the construction of patterns of 
development are exposed. We start from the method designed by Chenery and Syrquin 
(1975), and since the statistical procedure has to be applied to a wide range of structural 
processes and countries, the scope for a more refined econometric specification is 
constrained by the availability of data.17 
In addition to confirming the existence of patterns of development common to 
modern Europe, a major goal of this essay is to separate the effects of universal factors, 
common to all countries, from particular characteristics of each one, in order to 
highlight national deviations from the European patterns of development. I, therefore, 
assume that any indicator of structural change, Iit, for i= country, and t= time period, 
can be divided into two different parts: 
 I f U f Vit it i it? ?1 2? ?, ,  (1) 
where, ?  is a k? 1 vector of time and cross-country invariant parameters; Uit is a vector 
of explanatory variables representing the level of development, market size, economies 
of scale, etc. in country i at period t; ? i  is a time invariant but cross-country variant 
vector of parameters; and Vit represents a set of explanatory variables, including a 
stochastic disturbance (which incorporates war, political unification, etc.). Uit includes 
the explanatory variables in Chenery and Syrquin (1975), to which others for country 
size and a time-trend component have been added: 
U'it= [c, LnYit, (LnYit)
2, LnNit, (LnNit)
2, INFLit, LnSizei, TRENDt] (2) 
where c is a constant term; Yit, real income per head; Nit, population; INFLit, net 
imports as a share of GDP; Sizei, country i's extension in square kilometres; TRENDt, 
time trend dummy. 
                                                 
17 Branson et al. (1998) faced the same constraint for the last quarter of the twentieth century. 
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Under these conditions, f1(? ,Uit) will be the part of the structural variable Iit 
that can be explained by the pattern of development common to all countries, while the 
divergence of country i from the pattern will be f2(? i,Vit). Then, assuming that ?  
exists amounts to accepting that a common pattern does exist. Next the necessary 
assumptions to estimate the patterns of development properly have to be established. I 
have preferred the semi- log to the double- log formulation in order to retain the additive 
property for the different components of aggregates (i.e., sectoral shares of output must 
add to 100). In addition, it will be assumed that f1(? ,Uit)=? *Uit. Under these 
conditions, we have: 
Ii t = ? 0 + ? 1* LnYi t + ? 2* LnYi t2 + ? 3* LnNit + ? 4* LnNi t2 + ? 5* INFLi t  
        + ? 6* LnSIZEi + ? 6* LnTRENDi + f2 (? i, Vi t)                                                     (3)                                                                                         
Following Chenery and Syrquin (1975) income per head works as an overall 
index of development and as a measure of output. Population represents the market size 
and captures the effect of economies of scale and transport costs on patterns of 
production and trade. These effects are independent of the income level, since no 
correlation is expected between market size and level. In addition, quadratic terms are 
included to allow for non- linearities. In our sample, each country's population size 
changes substantially as our time coverage is of one and a half centuries, and a new 
country-size variable that represents the surface of the country helps to control for it, 
while it works at the same time as a country-dummy. The time-trend variable should 
capture universal changes over time not associated with the other independent variables 
(e.g., institutions, policies, etc.) that affect all countries alike. The time-trend dummy 
eliminates all variation between time periods so that the original panel data sample can 
easily be treated like a simple pool of cross-section data, as regards the econometric 
approach.  
The target now will be to estimate the ? ? ? ?0 1 2 7, , , . . .  vector. For this 
estimate to be consistent, I will assume that there is no correlation between variables 
included in Uit and Vit. This is a very strong assumption that may not be true in 
practice and, therefore, one must be very cautious when interpreting the econometric 
results.18 If such an assumption holds true, I will be able to isolate additively and 
                                                 
18 To avoid this problem, it could have been assumed that Vit = Vi , ? t and f2 (ßi,Vi)= ß i’*Vi. This linear 
specification would permit to eliminate the term f2 (ßi,Vi) taking deviations with respect to the mean in the 
time-varying dimension (within-group estimator). But, in that case, I would also get rid of a0. This would 
not be present a major problem if I were sure that a0 is really a constant because, in such a case several 
estimation techniques could be used consistently. However, it is easy to guess that a0 will present several 
structural changes in its long time -varying dimension, and testing this hypothesis is another goal of this 
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consistently the part of the structural variable that can be explained by a common 
pattern of development, and obtain f2(? i,Vit) as a residual that measures the particular 
divergence of each country's structural indicator from the pattern.  
The formulation described so far is what I will call the single pattern because the time-
varying regressors are supposed to have homogeneous effects on each structural 
variable over the whole time span. A second and more historically relevant approach 
has been introduced to test and, in its case, to detect the existence of structural changes 
in the constant term and in the slopes of LnY and LnN in different sub-periods of our 
sample. This method allows us to go beyond the time-trend dummy that stands for an 
exogenous uniform shift but is unable to discriminate among periods (Chenery and 
Syrquin 1975, p. 154). The outcome is the adjusted pattern. Three historical periods 
were chosen to test structural breaks: the period prior to World War I, the Interwar 
years, 1920-1938, and the post-World War II period up to 1990.19 To allow for different 
possibilities of structural change over these historical periods, dummy variables are 
defined in Table 1. 
  
Regression Analysis 
The econometric results for both single and adjusted patterns, presented in the 
Appendix, deserve some comments. The main finding is that existence of patterns of 
development common to modern European countries appears to be confirmed. Adjusted 
R squared and statistical tests indicate so. If accumulation and resource allocation 
processes are examined we can find, for example, that as regards the composition of 
demand, both coefficients of income and population present the expected sign, as 
income is negatively related to consumption (total and private) and positively to 
domestic investment, while the opposite occurs to population. Size and trend dummies 
also correlate positively to investment and negatively to consumption (only to private 
consumption for the time trend). Larger countries appear to invest more at given levels 
of income and investment rates increase as time goes by, regardless of income (while 
the opposite happens to private consumption). In the adjusted patterns, a dummy 
variable for the slope of LnY in different periods allow us to locate structural breaks, 
                                                                                                                                               
essay. For such a reason, I finally decided to assume the lack of correlation between Uit and Vit, and to go 
on with the initial specification. 
19 The choice of 1990 as the end year in this investigation is due to the fact that the demise of 
communism in Europe changed borders and was followed by a transition to the market in central and 
eastern European countries that have not been taken on board while they were command economies and 
accumulation and resource allocation were not ruled by market forces. Thus, this paper cover the late 
nineteenth century (1850-1913) and, to use Hobsbawn’s expression, ‘the short’ twentieth century (1914-
1990). 
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from which emerges that, for investment, as it could be expected, the estimated 
coefficient of income reached the highest value in the post-World War II era, and the 
lowest in the interwar years. The same happens (but with a negative sign) to private 
consumption, with larger absolute values for the post-1950 period, and a positive 
coefficient for the interwar years.  
The supply side offers the expected correlation between income and population 
on the one hand, and agricultural shares in output and employment on the other, i.e., 
negative for income and positive for population, while a positive one appears for 
industry shares in output and employment with respect to income 20. When the estimated 
coefficient on the quadratic term shows an opposite sign to that of the linear term, it 
means that the relation between structural change and income level attenuates as GDP 
per head rises. The time-trend and size dummies show a positive sign for agricultural 
shares in output and employment, independently from the level of income (while the 
opposite is observed for industry). In the case of agriculture, the estimated coefficient 
for income, negative, is higher in absolute terms for the period prior to World War I (as 
the adjusted coefficients reveal).  
Urbanization, as expected, is positively related to income and population and 
also to net imports (a proxy for capital inflow), while is negatively correlated to the 
country's size. Human capital indicators (school enrolment and literacy) consistently 
show positive correlations with income and negative ones to population and size. The 
time trend appears to be positive for primary and secondary schooling although the 
income coefficient was higher before World War I. 
The demographic transition shows the expected negative relation to income for 
birth and death (including infant mortality). For the adjusted pattern, fertility (both gross 
and net) is positively related to income. Such a result suggests that findings for the post-
1960 world, i.e., a negative relation between net fertility and income (Barro 
(1991,422)), cannot be simply extrapolated to earlier periods in which economic 
development helped to reduce infant mortality and, therefore, increased net fertility. A 
clear negative time trend appears for all demographic indicators. 
Finally, foreign trade indicators unanimous ly show a positive relation to income 
(with larger estimated coefficients as time goes by), and a negative one to population 
and size, as well as a negative time trend which suggests that latecomers tend to be less 
                                                 
20 When quadratic terms exist, the resulting overall value has been obtained by weighting coefficients for 
quadratic and non quadratic terms with income values ranging from 1,000 to 15,000 US dollars at 1990 
prices (PPP). Not clear relationship appears for population and industry shares in output and employment 
(positive for the single pattern, negative for the adjusted pattern). For services shares, there is a negative 
correlation for population, while for income it is only negative for the single pattern. 
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open at similar income levels. The positive link between population and manufacturing 
exports is the exception and might suggest a Linder's (1961) scenario of representative 
demand, in which producing industrial goods for home consumption appears as a pre-
requisite for exporting them. 
 
Normal Structural Variation with the Level of Development 
Table 2 presents the structural transformation that occurs as real GDP per head 
grows. Simulations are provided for all development processes within an income range 
from 1,000 to 12,000 dollars (at 1990 ‘international’ prices (PPP)), when most of the 
transition from a pre- industrial to a modern society occurs. Three development 
processes are considered, i.e., accumulation, resource allocation, and demographic 
transition. Together with the normal structural change associated to a rise in GDP per 
head, growth elasticities have been computed for given levels of per capita income and 
its changes (Table 3). 
Most development processes were half-completed at early stages of 
development, somewhere in between 3,000 and 4,000 dollars, and four-fifths of the 
transformation had occurred by a 8,000 dollar income21. The implication is that growth 
in post-World War II Europe, the period from where most economic theorists derived 
their stylised facts, is weakly related to resource allocation22. 
In the accumulation process, proxies for physical and human capital have been 
considered. Information on GDP expenditure components permitted to derive net 
imports of goods and services as a residual which, in turn, proxied capital net inflow, 
and, as a result, to derive the rate of national saving (expressed as a share of GDP). The 
comparison between investment and saving suggests a life-cycle behaviour, in which 
domestic saving is lower than investment demand at initial levels of the trans ition, with 
the gap closing as income rises. In both cases, the share of GDP increases as income 
rises, multiplying over the total income range considered by a ratio of 3.5 in the case of 
saving (2.4 times up to $4,000, the mid- transition point), and by 2.8 in the case of 
investment (2.0 up to $4,000), that is, representing a gain of 16.3 percentage points for 
saving, and 14.7 for investment (9.1 and 8.2 by $4,000, when half the transition was 
completed). Proximate indices for human capital also show large increases, multiplying 
                                                 
21 Pro-memoria, A per capita income of $4,000 was reached by the U.K. in the 1890s, and by France in 
the mid-1920's; a level of $8,000 was reached by the UK or Germany in the early 1960s; and $12,000 was 
the income of France and Germany in the early 1970s (Maddison 2003). 
22 Such an empirical fact reinforced perhaps the neoclassical assumption that adjustments within the 
economy were immediate and frictionless. 
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by 2 over the transition (1.6 by half of it), that is, up to 52.5 percentage points for 
literacy, and 33.8 for schooling, (29.3 and 18.8 up to $4,000). 
Associated to growth, there are structural shifts in the allocation of resources. 
Resource allocation interacts with factor endowments, economic policies and 
productivity growth to condition the path of development. We can analyse demand and 
supply changes separately. Overall consumption fell by 20 per cent throughout the 
transition (10 per cent when half of it was achieved), that is, declining from over 90 per 
cent of aggregate demand to around three-fourths. Trends in private and government 
consumption followed, however, opposite directions, while the former fell by 31 per 
cent, the latter rose by 188 per cent (-17 and 105 per cent, respectively, over the first 
half of the transition). In percentage points, the variations represent 27.3 percentage 
points of decline for private and 10.9 of rise for public consumption (-15.2 and 6.1 by 
half the transition). 
On the supply side, a decline occurs in agriculture's shares in output and 
employment, while, for industry and services, there is an increase. It is worth 
mentioning that absolute increases are more noticeably in the shares of services (28.8 
and 38.7 percentage points gained for output and employment, respectively, over the 
transition) than for industry (12.1 and 17.1, respectively), in particular, at higher income 
levels (over $4,000). Agriculture's supremacy in output and employment disappears by 
$3,000, and $4,000, respectively. Interestingly enough, the proportional change implied 
by the transition differs from output to employment. It means that relative (average) 
labour productivity (that is, the ratio of each sector’s share in output to that in 
employment) differs across sectors and, consequently, that efficiency improvements in 
the use of labour do not proceed at the same pace across sectors. In agriculture, a 
sharper decline can be noticed for its output's share (-41.1 percentage points) than for its 
employment's share (-55.8) (where a relative and, then, an absolute decline is 
experienced), which explains why the productivity gap widens as income rises. The 
lagged shift of labour out of agriculture due to low mobility of the workforce, as it is the 
case when surplus labour in agriculture exists, contributes to explaining the productivity 
gap. Besides, partial productivity differences appear in most industrialization 
experiences as investment and technological change occur more often in modern 
industry and services23. Had all sectors the same production function, average labour 
productivity would equalise across them, provided the same factor prices and a 
complete resource mobility for all (Chenery 1988, p. 256). Data constraints, however, 
                                                 
23 Cf. Chenery and Syrquin (1975, p. 48).  
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do not allow me to address differentials in marginal productivity. A caveat to be made 
about relative labour productivity derives from the weakness of statistical data for 
employment in agriculture. In fact, at lower income levels, when the division of labour 
is not widely diffused yet, figures for economically active population in agriculture (the 
main historical source for employment) tend to be over-exaggerated, as part-time 
labourers in industry and services tend to register under their main professions, e.g., 
farmers and, hence, figures for industry and services understated24. 
The share of population living in towns over 20,000 inhabitants is the arbitrary 
threshold used here to assess the degree of urbanization. A rapid increase in 
urbanization takes place as income rises. A multiplier of 3.9 applies for the entire 
transition (2.6 for half of it), representing a 36 percentage point rise (20 up to $4,000). 
Besides, a decline in the proportion of agricultural labour within rural population 
(measured as the ratio of the agricultural share in total employment to the rural share in 
total population) occurs as GDP per head improves, suggesting that people living in the 
countryside tends to work increasingly outside agriculture as economic growth proceeds 
(from three quarters to one-fifth over the transition). 
Development patterns for international trade help us to search for the sources of 
a country's comparative advantage and its changes as income grows. Historically, 
natural resource endowments, factor proportions, and economic policies have 
conditioned trade specialisation. Examination of trade patterns shows a close link 
between the rise in GDP per head and that in trade ratio to GDP (33.7 percentage point 
gain for openness, that is, exports plus imports), though the gain of imports exceeds that 
of exports. A possible explanation for the latter would be that as their income grow, 
countries become competitive in services, as in nineteenth century Century Britain 
(Imlah 1958) or attractive to foreign capital, as Spain in the 1860s-1880s (Prados de la 
Escosura 2005). Changes in comparative advantage from primary production to 
manufacturing are revealed by the composition of exports as income grows. 
Manufactured exports overcome those of primary goods around $4,000 of income. 
Meanwhile, industry's share in GDP becomes larger than agriculture's at $3,000. Such a 
lag suggests that, in Europe, the emergence of a domestic market for industrial goods is 
previous to that of foreign markets.  
Finally, the demographic transition suggests a decline in both natality and 
mortality, in which the former experienced a deeper absolute fall, with the result of a 
                                                 
24 Cf. Federico (2005) and O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura (1992). Adjustment for actual days worked 
would further reduce the size of labour force in agriculture. Cf. Prados de la Escosura and Rosés (2005) 
for an exploration  of the Spanish case. 
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slowing down in the rate of natural increase (by 6.6 percentage points), as income per 
head improves. Meanwhile, a decline in gross fertility is softened in net terms by the 
more rapid reduction in infant mortality. 
So far only tendencies have been pointed out. Table 3 provides a more precise 
measurement of the responsiveness of structural transformation to changes in GDP per 
head for each development process. Elasticities have been computed both at a given 
level of per capita income (point estimates) and for income changes (discrete estimates), 
covering most of the transition from a pre- industrial into a modern economy. It appears 
that, in both estimates, the lower the income level, the higher the value of the coefficient 
for growth elasticity, with the exception of those cases in which a negative relationship 
exists, where the opposite occurs. Differences in the structural response to increases in 
income are worth noticing. Both measures of (absolute) elasticities are higher, at low 
income levels, for investment and government consumption, the share of services in 
total employment and urbanization and manufactured exports, while the opposite occurs 
for agriculture’s shares in output and employment, fertility (gross and net), infant 
mortality and crude birth and death rates. 
  
Early Starters and Latecomers  
Up to this point, the discussion has been carried out on the basis of development 
patterns common to Modern Europe over one and a half centuries. However, when one 
and a half centuries is being considered, distinctive structural behaviour at different 
historical periods should be expected. The adjusted patterns of development allow for 
historical differences in structural change across different phases (up to World War I, in 
the Interwar years, and in the post-World War II era) and, therefore, help to 
distinguishing the features of early starters and late comers. A similar approach to the 
one used in the construction of average single patterns has been followed for the 
adjusted patterns. Table 4 presents the patterns, while growth elasticities appear in Table 
5. For the sake of simplicity, only the $1,000- $4,000 income range has been considered 
as, actually, most European countries had not reached the upper level by 1913. 
Gerschenkron provided a set of propositions that can be tested with the help of 
the adjusted development patterns. Thus, he asserted that, the more backwards a country 
is, a) the faster the growth of industrial output; b) more intense the stress on bigness of 
both industrial plant and enterprise; c) the greater the stress upon producers’ goods; d) 
the stronger the pressure on private consumption levels; e) the greater the role of 
institutional factors in promoting industrialization (banks, the State), and f) the less 
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active the role of agriculture in industrialization, that is, its provision of a market for 
industry by rising labour productivity (Gerschenkron 1962, pp. 353-54).25 
Unfortunately, only some of Gerschenkron's hypotheses about European 
development can be subjected to quantitative testing: The evidence presented here 
provides an empirical test if we associate proposition a), to the size (and the increases) 
in the share of industry in output and employment; hypotheses b),  c) and d) to the 
shares of GDP allocated to investment and private consumption, respectively; 
proposition e), to the share of GDP assigned to government consumption, and, finally, 
hypothesis f) to the productivity gap and the relative size of agriculture in GDP and 
labour force. 
From the comparison between Pre-World War I and the average single patterns 
of development for 19th and 20th centuries some interesting findings can be reported. 
As regards propositions b) and c), accumulation in both human and physical capital 
proceeded at a different pace before the Great War (Table 4); it was larger at low 
income levels and smaller at high ones, i.e., pre-1914 investment was higher below a 
per capita income of $2,000, as it was the case of literacy and schooling below a $3,000 
income. Thus, the lower investment rates in physical and human capital for the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century provides support to Gerschenkron’s content ion of 
latecomers’ emphasis on producers’ goods. 
Differences observed for resource allocation processes offer an answer to 
propositions d) and e). Thus, the composition of expenditure prior to World War I 
points to a higher (overall) consumption over $2,000, with the share of private 
consumption larger and that of government consumption smaller above $1,000. It 
means that early starters suffer from a lower pressure on private consumption while the 
size of Government, usually correlated to its activist role, was smaller, as 
Gerschenkron’s asserted. 
The supply side shows noticeable differences for the pre-1914 patterns and 
provides responses to propositions a) and f). Before the Great War, European 
agriculture presents a larger size of GDP for any income level, and a smaller labour 
force over a $1,000 income, than the average single pattern. As a result, a lower 
productivity gap emerges, which tends to close as income rises. In other words, early 
starters exhibit a smaller agriculture in terms of employment and a larger size in terms 
of output and, hence, relative average labour productivity in agriculture was higher than 
in the case of the late comers. The lagged shift of labour out of agriculture and its higher 
                                                 
25 A critical assessment of Gerschenkron's views can be found in O'Brien (1986). Gerschenkron's views 
are examined in the light of research during the late twentieth century in Sylla and Toniolo (1992). 
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productivity gap confirm Gerschenkron's (1962) contention that late comers’ agriculture 
had a less active role in economic growth. 
Industry and services lower shares in GDP (the latter up to $3,000) and higher 
ones in employment (over $1,000 in the case of industry) complete a more balanced 
labour allocation prior to the Great War. Besides, a more urbanized society and a 
smaller proportion of its rural population involved in agricultural activities appears 
above $2,000 in the pre-World War I patterns. However, in the case of the latecomers, 
the relative size of industrial output grew faster within the same income range, 
supporting Gerschenkron’s contention of more intense industrial growth in the case of 
latecomers.  
Differences in international trade also appear between average and pre-World 
War I patterns of development, as the latter exhibits a more open economy over $1,000 
in which the larger share of manufacturing exports reveals its comparative advantage. 
The systematic commodity trade surplus in early starters in contrast with the deficit in 
latecomers (that emerges from the average, single, pattern) points to a higher investment 
demand than domestic saving in the case of latecomers while the opposite appears to 
occur in that of early starters (nineteenth century Britain and France provide good 
examples) (Imlah, 1958; Lévy-Leboyer, 1978).   
Higher birth and death rates, and lower population pressure below $4,000, plus 
higher fertility and infant mortality, are the main demographic differences for pre-1914 
Europe when compared with average, single patterns.  
Comparing growth elasticities for each structural variable at given income 
levels, or as income increases for different historical phases, is most illuminating. 
Values (in absolute terms) for both measures of elasticity for the pre-World War I era 
are shown in Table 5. The comparison with those of elasticities for the average patterns 
of development (Table 3) indicates that, in the income range $1,000-4,000 lower values 
are found for both the shares of investment and of industry in GDP. It might be 
suggested that such a result is associated to latecomers’ catching up with early starters 
and lends support to Gerschenkron’s propositions a), b), and c). Nonetheless, larger 
growth elasticity for human capital formation and for openness, two ingredients of 
successful industrialization, are exhibited in the pre-World War I patterns. Moreover, a 
much lower value of the growth elasticity for Government consumption in early starters 
tends to confirm the idea of the State’s stronger stand in latecomers. Finally, the higher 
(absolute) value of the growth elasticity for the agricultural share in employment and for 
the urbanization rate among the early starters reinforces the view of a less dynamic rural 
sector in the case of latecomers. 
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 It can be inferred, then, that Gerschenkron's stylised patterns of European 
development are not rejected by the empirical evidence provided here.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
In this paper European development patterns that associate structural change to 
variations in GDP per head and population have been examined in historical 
perspective. Europe provides a suitable scenario for testing regularities of growth since 
its nations share a common set of institutions, policies, and resource endowments. Some 
lessons can be derived. 
Patterns of structural change, constructed along the lines of Chenery and Syrquin 
(1975) pathbreaking work, confirm the existence of  a common set of development 
processes associated to rising per capita income for the whole of Europe. However, 
discernable development patterns for different epochs (observed with the adjusted 
patterns) confirm Gerschenkron’s (1962) perception that early starters and latecomers 
followed their own paths of economic modernization. 
 Differences between stylised features of development in early starters and 
latecomers raise interesting questions for further research. Are latecomers penalised by 
the fact that, at the same level of income per head, their investment and consumption 
shares of GDP are larger and lower, respectively, than for an early starter? Or do such 
differences, actually, result from a wider range of investment opportunities?.26 
Demonstration effects and the awareness that a higher rate of investment helps to catch-
up are perhaps behind such a differential. As Gerschenkron (1962, p. 8) put it, ‘the 
opportunities inherent in industrialization (..) vary directly with the backwardness of the 
country’.  
Chenery and Syrquin (1975, p.64) reminded us that ‘the analysis of the 
uniformity of development patterns constitutes a first step towards identifying the 
sources of diversity’. Each country's deviations from the estimated patterns at a given 
level of income per head and population, are associated to country-specific 
characteristics such as resource endowments, institutions, and policies, and the extent to 
which such a differential behaviour in accumulation, resource allocation, and 
demographic transition is behind the distinctive performance of latecomers deserves to 
be fully investigated within the framework of modern growth literature.  
                                                 
26 Chenery (1977, p. 458). Besides, in recent times larger investment seems to be required to reach 
economies of scale and scope in modern industry and services. 
 17 
 
REFERENCES 
ADELMAN, I. and C. T. MORRIS (1984). Patterns of Economic Growth, 1850-
1914, or Chenery-Syrquin in Historical Perspective. In M. Syrquin, L Taylor and L. 
E. Westphal (eds), Economic Structure and Performance, Essays in Honor of Hollis 
B. Chenery. San Diego: Academic Press, pp. 45-74. 
BAKKER, G.P. den, T.A. HUITKER and C.A. van BOCHOVE (1990). The Dutch 
Economy 1921-1938: Revised Macroeconomic Data for the Interwar Period Review 
of Income and Wealth 36, pp. 187-206. 
BAIROCH, P. (1976). Commerce extérieur et développement économique de l'Europe 
au XIX e siècle. Paris: Mouton. 
BAIROCH, P., T. DELDYCKE, H. GELDERS, and J.-M. LIMBOR (1968). The 
Working Population and its Structure. Brussels and New York. 
BALDWIN, R.E. (1958). The Commodity Composition of Trade: Selected 
Industrial Countries, 1900-1954 Review of Economics and Statistics, 40, pp. 50-71. 
BARRO, R.J. (1989). A Cross-Country Study of Growth, Saving and Government. 
NBER, Working Paper 2855. 
BARRO, R.J. (1991). Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 106, pp. 407-43. 
BATCHELOR, R.A, R. L. MAJOR and A. D. MORGAN (1980). Industrialisation and 
the Basis for Trade. The National Institute of Economic and Social Research. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
BATISTA, D., C. MARTINS, M. PINHEIRO and J. REIS (1997). New Estimates of 
Portugal’s GDP 1910-1958. Lisbon: Banco de Portugal. 
BHAGWATI, J.N. (1977).  ‘Comment’ to H. B. Chenery, ‘Transitional Growth and 
World Industrialization’. In B. Ohlin et al.  (eds), The International Allocation of 
Economic Activity. London: Macmillan, pp. 496-98. 
BRANSON, W.H., I. GUERRERO, and B.G. GUNTER (1998). Patterns of 
Development, 1970-1994, World Bank Working Paper. 
BUYST, E. (1997). New GNP Estimates for the Belgian Economy during the Interwar 
Period Review of Income and Wealth 43, pp. 357-75. 
CAPANNA, A. and O. MESSORI. (1940). Gli scambi commercials dell'Italia con 
1'estero. Roma. 
CARRE, J.J., P. DUBOIS and E. MALINVAUD (1976). French Economic Growth. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 18 
CARRERAS, A., ed. (1989). Estadísticas Históricas de España, Siglos XIX—XX. Madrid: 
Fundación Banco Exterior. 
CARTAXO, R.J. and DA ROSA, N.E. (1986). Series longas para as contas nacionais 
portuguesas 1958-1985, Banco do Portugal, Documento de Trabalho 15. 
CHENERY, H.B.(1960).  Patterns of Industrial Growth American Economic Review 
50, pp. 624- 54. 
CHENERY, H.B. (1986a). Growth and Transformation. In H.B. Chenery, S. 
Robinson and M. Syrquin (eds), Industrialization and Growth. New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp.13-36. 
CHENERY, H.B. (1986b). Structural Transformation: A Program of Research. In G. 
Ranis and T.P. Schultz (eds), The State of Development Economics. Progress and 
Perspectives. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 49-77. 
CHENERY, H.B. (1988). Introduction to Part II: Structural Transformation. In H. B. 
Chenery and T. N. Srinivasan (eds), Handbook of Development Economics, 2 vols. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland, vol. I, pp. 197-202. 
CHENERY, H.B. and SYRQUIN, M. (1975). Patterns of Development, 1950-1970. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
CHENERY, H.B. and L. TAYLOR (1968). Development Patterns: Among Countries 
and Over Time Review of Economics and Statistics  50, pp. 391-416. 
CHESNAIS, J.C. (1986). La transition démographique. Institut National d'Études 
Démographiques. Travaux et documents, Cahier no. 113. Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France. 
CLARK, C. (1940), The Conditions of Economic Progress . London: Macmillan. 
DENISON, E.F. (1967). Why Growth Rates Differ. Postwar Experience in Nine Countries. 
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution 
DEUTSCH, K.W. and ECKSTEIN, A. (1961). National Industrialization and the 
Declining Share of the International Economic Sector, 1890-1959. World Politics 13, 
pp. 267-299. 
DIAZ ALEJANDRO, C. (1976). Review of Patterns of Development 1950-1970. 
by M. Chenery and M. Syrquin Economic Journal 86, pp. 401-3. 
DOWRICK, S. and N. GEMMELL (1991). Industrialisation, Catching up and Economic 
Growth: A Comparative Study Across The World's Capitalist Economies  Economic 
Journal 101, pp.. 263-75 
ECKSTEIN, A. (1955). National Income and Capital Formation in Hungary, 1900-1950 
Income and Wealth  V, pp. 150-223. 
 19 
EDDIE, S. (1977). The Terms and Patterns of Hungarian Foreign Trade, 1889-1913   
Journal of Economic History 37, pp. 329-58. 
EICHENGREEN, B. (1986). What Have We Learned from Historical Comparison of 
Income and Productivity?. In P. O'Brien (ed), International Productivity Comparisons and 
Problems of Measurement, 1750-1939.  Ninth International Economic History, Bern, pp. 
26-35. 
ERCOLANI, P. (1978). Documentazione statistica di base. In G. Fua (ed), Lo sviluppo 
economico in Italia, III, pp. 388-472. 
FEINSTEIN, C. M. (1972). National Income, Expenditure and Output  of the UK, 1855-
1965. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
FEDER, G. (1986). Growth in Semi-Industrial Countries: A Statistical Analysis. In H. B. 
Chenery, S. Robinson and M. Syrquin (eds), Industrialisation and Economic Growth. New 
York: Oxford University Press, pp. 263-82. 
FEDERICO, G. (2005). Feeding the World. An Economic History of Agriculture, 1800-
2000. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
FEENY, D. (1987). The Explanation of Economic Changes: The Contribution of 
Economic History to Development Economics. In A. J. Field (ed), The Future of Economic 
History. Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff, pp. 91-119. 
FLORA, P. (1973). Historical Process of Social Mobilization: Urbanization and Literacy, 
1850-1965. In S.N. Eisenstadt and S. Rokker (eds), Building State and Nation, pp 213-58. 
FLORA, P (1987). State, Economy and Society in Western Europe, 1815-1975. Frankfurt: 
Campus Verlag GmbM. 
FREMDLING, R. (1988). German National Accounts for the 19th and Early 20th 
Century. A Critical Assesment Vierte jahrschrift fair Social- and Wirtschaftsgeschichtes, 
75, pp. 339-55. 
FUA, G. (1978-81). Lo sviluppo economico in Italia. Storia dell' economia italiana negli 
ultimi ciento anni. Milano: Franco Angeli, 3 vols. 
GERSCHENKRON, A. (1962). Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. A Book 
of Essays. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
GOOD, D.F. (1994). The Economic Lag of Central and Eastern Europe: Income 
Estimates for the Habsburg Succesor States, 1870-1910 Journal of Economic History 
54, pp. 869-91. 
GREGORY, P. (1982). Russian National Income. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
HANSEN, S.A. (1974). Økonomisk vœkst i Danmark. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag. 
 20 
HAYAMI, Y. and RUTTAN, W.V. (1985). Agricultural Development. An International 
Perspective. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
HJEERPE, R. (1988). The Finnish Economy, 1860-1985. Growth and Structural Change. 
Helsinki: Bank of Finland. 
HJERPPE, R. (1994). Finland's Historical National Accounts 1860-1994: Calculation 
Methods and Statistical Tables. Jyväskylä: J.Y.H.L. 
HODNE, F. and O.H. GRYTTEN (1994). Gross Domestic Product of Norway 1835-
1915. Occasional Papers in Economic History, Umea University. 
HOFFMANN, W.G.(1965). Das Wachstum der Deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 
19.Jahrhunderts. Berlin: Springer. 
HORLINGS, E. (1997). The Contribution of the Service Sector to Gross Domestic 
Product in Belgium, 1835-1990. Universiteit Utrecht (mimeo). 
IMLAH, A.H. (1958). Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica. Studies in British Foreign 
Trade in the XIXth Century. Harvard: Harvard University Press. 
JUSTINO, D. (1987). A evoluçâo do Producto Nacional Bruto em Portugal, 1850-1910. 
Algunas estimativas provisorias Análise Social 23, pp. 451-61.  
KAUSEL,  A. (1979). Österreichs Volkseinkommen 1830 bis 1913. In Österreichisches 
Statistisches Zentralamt, Geschichte und Ergebnisse der zentralen amtlichen Statistik 
in Österreich 1829-1979. Beitraege zur öesterreichischen Statistik, Heft 550. Vienna. 
KINDLEBERGER, C.P. (1967). Europe's Postwar Growth. The Role of Labour Supply. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press. 
KOSTELENOS, George (1995). Money and Output in Modern Greece, 1858-1938. 
Athens: Centre of  Planning and Economic Research (KEPE). Studies 44. 
KRANTZ, O. (1997). Swedish Historical National Accounts 1800-1990. Aggregate 
Output Series. Umea University (mimeo) 
KUZNETS, S. (1959). On Comparative Study of Economic Structure and Growth of 
Nations. In National Bureau of Economic Research, The Comparative Study of Economic 
Growth and Structure. New York: NBER. 
KUZNETS, S. (1966). Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure and Spread. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
KUZNETS, S. (1967). Quantitative Aspects of the Economic-Growth of Nations, X: 
Level and Structure of Foreign Trade: Long-Term Trends Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 15, 2. 
KUZNETS, S. (1971). Economic Growth of Nations. Cambridge, Mass.: Bellknap. 
LAINS, P. (2005). Growth in a Protected Environment: Portugal, 1870-1950 (mimeo). 
 21 
LAMARTINE YATES, P. (1959). Forty Years of Foreign Trade. A Statistical Handbook 
with Special Reference to Primary Products and Under Developed Countries. London: 
George Allen and Unwin. 
LANDES, D.S. (1969). The Unbounded Prometheus: Technological Change and 
Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to Present . Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
LETHBRIDGE, E. (1985). National Income and Product. In M. C. Kaser and E. A. 
Radice (eds), The Economic History of Eastern Europe, 1919-1975. II, Economic Structure 
and Performance between the two Wars. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 532-97. 
LEVY-LEBOYER, M. (1978). Capital Formation in France. In M.M. Postan and P. 
Mathias (eds), Cambridge Economic History of Europe. VII, Part 1. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 231-95. 
LEVY-LEBOYER, M. and F. BOURGUIGNON (1985). L'économie Francaise au XIXe 
siècle. Analyse Macro-économique. Paris: Economica. 
LEWIS, W.A. (1954). Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor The 
Manchester School 22, pp. 139-91. 
LINDER, B. (1961). An Essay on Trade and Transformation. New York: Wiley. 
MADDISON, A. (1990). A Long Run Perspective on Saving. Institute of Economic 
Research Faculty of Economics, University of Groningen, Research Memorandum, no. 
443. 
MADDISON, A. (1993). Standardised Estimates of Fixed Investment and Capital 
Stock: A Six Country Comparison Innovazione e Materie Prime pp. 3-29. 
MADDISON, A. (2003). The World Economy: Historical Statistics. Paris: OECD. 
MAIZELS, A. (1963). Industrial Growth and World Trade World Trends in Production, 
Consumption and Trade in Manufactures. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
MARX, K. (1867). Das Capital. London. 
McCLOSKEY, D.N. (1981a). The Achievements of the Cliometric School. In D. N. 
McCloskey, Enterprise and Trade in Victorian Britain. Essays in Historical Economics. 
London: George Allen and Unwin, pp.3-18 
McCLOSKEY, D.N (1981b). Does the Past Have Useful Economics? In D. N 
McCloskey, Enterprise and Trade in Victorian Britain. Eassays in Historical Economics. 
London: George Allen and Unwin, pp.19-52. 
MEIER, G. and BALDWIN, R.E. (1957). Economic Development. Theory, History, 
Policy. New York: Wiley. 
MIRONOV, B.N. (1991): El efecto de la educaci6n sobre el crecimiento económico: 
el caso de Rusia. Siglos XIX y XX, Revista de Historia Económica IX, pp. 165-97. 
 22 
MITCHELL, B.R. (1988). British Historical Statistics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
MITCHELL, B.R. (1992). European Historical Statistics 1750-1980. London: 
Stockton Press. 
MOLINAS, C. and L. PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA. (1989). Was Spain Different? 
Spanish Historical Backwardness Revisited Explorations in Economic History 26, pp. 
385-402. 
MORRIS, C.T. and I. ADELMAN (1986). Comparative Patterns of Development 
1850-1914. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
NELSON, R.R. and G. WRIGHT (1992). The Rise and Fall of American 
Technological Leadership: The Postwar Era in Historical Perspective Journal of 
Economic Literature 30, pp. 1931-64. 
NICOLAU, R. (1989). Población. In A. Carreras (ed), Estadísticas Históricas de 
España. Siglos XIX-XX. Madrid: Fundación Banco Exterior, pp. 49-90. 
NUNES, A.B. (1991). A evoluçâo da estrutura, por sesos, da populaçâo activa en 
Portugal -um indicador do crecimento económico (1889-1981) Análise Social 26, pp. 
707-22. 
NUNES, A.B., E. MATA and N. VALERIO (1989). Portuguese Economic Growth 
1833-1985 Journal of European Economic History 18, pp. 291-330. 
NÚÑEZ, C.E. (1992). La fuente de la riqueza. Educación y crecimiento económico en la 
España contemporánea. Madrid: Alianza. 
O'BRIEN, D.P. (1975). The Classical Economists. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
O'BRIEN, P.K. (1986). Do we Have a Typology for the Study of European 
Industrialization in the XIXth Century? Journal of European Economic History 15, pp. 
291-333. 
 O'BRIEN, P.K. and Ç. KEYDER (1978). Economic Growth in Britain and France 
(1780-1914). Two Paths to the Twentieth Century . London: Allen and Unwin. 
O'BRIEN, P.K. and L. PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA (1992). Agricultural 
Productivity and European Industralization, 1890-1980 Economic History Review 45, 
pp. 514-36. 
 OCDE (1991). Labour Force Statistics, 1969-1989. Paris. 
OCDE (1992). National Accounts, 1960-1990. Main Aggregates. Paris, vol. 1. 
OCDE (1991). Historical Statistics, 1960-1989. Paris. 
OCDE (1992). Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade. Paris. 
PERKINS, D. H. (1981). Three Decades of International Quantitative Comparisons. 
Harvard Institute for International Development (mimeo). 
 23 
PINHEIRO, M. (ed) (1997). Séries longas para a economia portuguesa pós II Guerra 
Mundial. I. Séries Estatísticas. Lisbon: Banco de Portugal 
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, L. (1988). De imperio a nación. Crecimiento y atraso 
económico en España (1780-1930). Madrid: Alianza. 
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, L. (2000). International Comparisons of Real 
Product, 1820-1990. An Alternative Data Set Explorations in Economic History 37, p. 
1-41. 
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, L. (2003). El progreso económico en España, 
1850-2000. Madrid: Fundación BBVA. 
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, L. (2005). La posición internacional de la economía 
española, 1850-1935: nueva evidencia sobre la balanza de pagos (mimeo). 
PRADOS DE LA ESCOSURA, L. and J.R. ROSÉS (2005). The Sources of Long-
run Growth in Spain, 1850-2000 (mimeo). 
RITSCHL, A. (1991), “Some National Accounts for Interwar Germany, 1925-1938” 
(mimeo). 
RITSCHL, A. and M. SPOERER (1997). Das Bruttosozialprodukt in Deutschland nach 
den amtlichen Volseinkommes- und Sozialproduktsstatistiken 1901-1995 Jahrbuch für 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte 2, pp. 27-54 
ROSSI, N., A. SORGATO and G. TONIOLO (1992). Italian Historical Statistics, 
1890-1990, Università degli Studi di Venezia, Dipartimento di Scienze 
Economiche, Nota di Lavoro, 92.18. 
ROSTOW, W.W. (1960). Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
SCHLOTE, W. (1952). British Overseas Trade from 1700 to the 1930's. Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
SCHULZE, M.S. (1997), "Re-Estimating Austrian National Income, 1870-1913: 
Methods and Sources". London School of Economics Working Papers in Economic 
History 36/97. 
SCHUMPETER, J.A. (1954). History of Economic Analysis. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
SMITH, A. (1776). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
London: Methuen. 
SMITS, J.P., E. HORLINGS and J.L. van ZANDEN (1997). The Measurement of 
Gross National Product and its Components. The Netherlands, 1800-1913. N.W. 
Posthumus Instituut Research Memorandum nr 1. 
 24 
SOLOW, R.M. (1956). A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 70, pp. 65-94. 
SOLOW, R.M. (1957). Technical Change and The Aggregate Production Function 
Review of Economics and Statistics 39, pp. 312-20. 
SOLOW, R.M. (1977).  ‘Comment’ to H.B. Chenery ‘Transitional Growth and 
World Industrialisation’. In B. Ohlin et al (eds), The International Allocation of 
Economic Activity. London: Macmillan, p. 491. 
SPIEGELGLAS, S. (1959). World Exports of Manufactures, 1956 vs. 1937 
Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies 27, pp. 111-39. 
SPOERER, M. (1997). Weimar’s Investment and Growth Record in Intertemporal and 
International Perspective European Review of Economic History 1,  pp. 271-97. 
SYLLA, R. and G. TONIOLO (eds), (1992). Patterns of  European Industrialization. The 
Nineteenth Century. London: Routledge. 
SYRQUIN, M. (1986a). Growth and Structural Change in Latin America Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 34, pp. 433-54. 
SYRQUIN, M. (1986b). Productivity Growth and Factor Reallocation. In H. B. Chenery, 
S. Robinson and M. Syrquin (eds), Industrialization and Growth. A Comparative Study. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, pp. 229-62. 
SYRQUIN, M. (1988). Patterns of Structural Change. In H. B. Chenery and T. N. 
Srinivasan (eds), Handbook of Development Economics, 2 vols. Amsterdam: North-
Holland, I, pp. 197-273. 
TENA, A. (1987). The Spanish Foreign Sector 1890-1985. Trends and Structure, 
European University Institute, Florence (mimeo). 
TENA, A. (1992). Las estadísticas históricas del comercio internacional: fiabilidad y 
comparabilidad. Madrid: Banco de España. 
TILLY (1978). Capital Formation in Germany in the Nineteenth Century. In M. M. 
Postan and P. Mathias (eds), Cambridge History of Europe VII, part 1, pp. 382-441. 
TOUTAIN, J.C. (1977). Les structures du commerce extérieur de la France, 1789-1970. 
In M. Levy-Leboyer (ed), La position international de la France Aspects économiques et 
financiers XIX e-XXe siècles, Paris, Editions EDHESS, pp 53-74.  
TOUTAIN, J.C. (1997). Le produit intérieur brut de la France, 1789-1990 Economies et 
Societés. Histoire Economique Quantitative Série HEQ 1, 11, pp. 5-136. 
UNESCO (various years). Statistical Yearbook. Paris.  
UNITED NATIONS (various years). Statistical Yearbook. New York.  
VITALI, O. (1970). Aspetti dello sviluppo economico italiano alla luce della 
ricostruzione della popolazione attiva. Roma. 
 25 
WILLIAMSON, J.G. (1986). The Constraints of Industrialization: Some Lessons of 
the First Industrial Revolution. Proceedings of the Eighth International Economic 
Association World Congress, New Delhi (mimeo). 
WORLD BANK (various years). Social Indicators of Development. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press. 
WORLD BANK (various years). World Tables. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
ZAMAGNI, V. (1987). A Century of Change: Trends in the Composition of Labour 
Force, 1881-1981 Historical Methods 44, pp. 36-97. 
ZAMAGNI, V. (1993). L'offerta di istruzione in Italia 1861-1987: un fattore dello 
sviluppo o un ostacolo? Università degli Studi di Cassino, Dipartimento Economia e 
Territorio, Working Papers 4.  
 
 
 26 
Sources 
GDP per head: For each country, levels of Gross Domestic Product per capita 
expressed in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars adjusted for purchasing power (OECD 1992) 
have been projected backwards with volume series derived from historical national 
accounts. This aggregate covers the output of goods and services at market prices for 
the whole economy excluding income received from, or paid for, foreign investment. 
Data derive from the sources listed below. Otherwise they come from Maddison (2003). 
Austria, GDP for Imperial (Habsburg) Austria is from Kausel (1979) for 1830-1860, 
and for 1870-1913 is from Schulze (1997). Modern (Republic of) Austria's level for 
1913 was derived by applying Good´s (1994) ratio (1.346) to Schulze’s Imperial 
estimates. Belgium, Horlings (1997), 1830-1913; average of GDP estimates from Buyst 
(1997) (income and expenditure approaches) and Horlings (1997) (output), for 1925-
1938. Czechoslovakia, Lethbridge (1985). France, Toutain (1997). Finland, Hjerppe 
(1994). Germany, 1850-1890, Hoffmann (1965); 1900-1950, Spoerer (1997) and Ritschl 
and Spoerer (1997). 1850-1900, GNP at market prices was obtained by re-scalating 
NNP with the GNP/NNP ratio for 1901-13, from Spoerer (1997). 1850-1913, GDP at 
market prices was computed from the GNP estimates and from data on net factor 
payments abroad taken from Hoffmann (1965) and Ritschl (1991). West Germany 
figures since 1950 include the Saar and West Berlin and figures for West Germany in 
1950-55 had to be re-scaled by 8.6 per cent. Greece, Kostelenos (1995), 1860-1938. 
Hungary, Imperial (Habsburg) Hungary 1870-1913 at 1913 prices from Schulze (1998). 
Modern (Republic of) Hungary 1913-1938, from Eckstein (1955) for the country as 
defined by the treaty of Trianon (1919 reflated by 5% to allow for GNP-NNP 
differences. Netherlands, Smits, Horlings and van Zanden (1997), 1820-1913; den 
Bakker, Huitker and van Bochove (1990), 1925-1938. Norway, Hodne and Grytten 
(1994), 1830-1913. Portugal, Lains (2005), 1850-1950; 1910-1955, Batista, Martins, 
Pinheiro and Reis (1997); 1955-1990, Pinheiro (1997). Russia, (Imperial) Gregory 
(1982), 1885-1913. Spain, Prados de la Escosura (2003). Sweden, Krantz (1997). 
United Kingdom, Mitchell (1988). 
Population: All figures are adjusted to refer mid-year and to take into 
account the territorial changes and are derived from Maddison (2003) and Mitchell 
(1992). Nicolau (1989) completes the figures for Spain. 
Demand Structure : Domestic Investment, Private and Public Consumption in 
current prices, as percentages of GDP, are taken from Mitchell (1992), Flora (1987), 
Maddison (1990), and OECD, National Accounts (1960-1990), for most of the 
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countries. Spanish figures are from Prados de la Escosura (2003). French figures were 
derived from Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1985) up to 1913, and Carré, Dubois and 
Malinvaud (1976) for the remaining years. Figures for Italy are from Ercolani (1978) for 
1861-1890 and Rossi, Sorgato and Toniolo (1992) for 1890-1990. In the case of 
Portugal, Batista et al. (1997), Pinehiro (1997), and Cartaxo and Da Rosa (1986) were 
the references used. For United Kingdom, Feinstein (1972) and Mitchell (1988). 
Output Structure: Three major economic sectors are distinguished: Agriculture 
(which includes forestry and fishing), Industry (mining, manufacture, construction and 
utilities) and services (commerce, transport and communications, banking and private 
services, and public administration). Figures are provided as percentages of GDP at 
current prices. Most figures are taken from Mitchell (1992), Flora (1987) and OECD, 
Historical Statistics. In the case of Spain, Prados de la Escosura (2003). For France, 
Toutain (1997) and for Germany prior to World War I, Tilly (1978) and Fremdling 
(1988). 
Labour Allocation: Distribution of working population by economic sectors. 
Three major economic sectors are distinguished: Agriculture (which includes forestry 
and fishing), Industry (mining, manufacture, construction and utilities) and services 
(commerce, transport and communications, banking and private services, and public 
administration). Figures are provided in the form of percentage of total labour force 
from Bairoch (1968), Flora (1987), Mitchell (1992) and OECD, Labour Force Statistics, 
1969-1989. National figures were completed with Lains (1992) and Nunes (1991) for 
Portugal; Toutain (1997) for France; Zamagni (1987) and Vitali (1970) for Italy; Prados 
de la Escosura (2003) for Spain. 
Foreign Trade : Figures for exports and imports are from Bairoch (1976), 
Kuznets (1967), Mitchell (1992) and OECD, National Accounts and Monthly 
Statistics of Foreign Trade. For Portugal figures are derived from Nunes, Mata and 
Valerio (1989). Spanish figures are from Prados de la Escosura (1988, 2003) and 
Tena (1992). 
With respect to manufactured export figures, we used Maizels (1963), Batchelor, 
Major and Morgan (1980), Baldwin (1958), Spiegelglas (1959), Deustsch and Eckstein 
(1961), Lamartine Yates (1959) and Kuznets (1967). Data for particular countries were 
completed with Prados de la Escosura (1988, 2003), Tena (1987) for Spain; Davis 
(1979), Schlote (1952) for United Kingdom; Levy-Leboyer and Bourguignon (1985) 
and Toutain (1977) for France; Eddie (1977) for Hungary; Lains (1992) for Portugal, 
and Capanna and Mesori (1940) for Italy. 
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Education: School enrolment refers to population attending primary and 
secondary school as a percentage of total population between 5 and 19 years old. 
Figures are from Mitchell (1992), Flora (1987), World Bank (1989, 1990 and 1991), 
United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, and Demographic Yearbook. As regards Literacy, 
it represents the percentage of literate population (those who can read and write) with 
respect to total population over 7 years old. In this case, figures are from Flora (1973), 
Mitchell (1992) and Hayami and Ruttan (1985). For Italy, Zamagni (1993); for Spain, 
Núñez (1992), and for Russia, Mironov (1991). 
Urbanization: Population living in towns of 20.000 of inhabitants or more, as a 
percentage of total population. Figures are from Flora (1973, 1987). 
Demographic Transition: Birth rate and death rates are defined as number of 
births and deaths per thousand of population. Infant mortality rate is the number of 
deaths per thousand births. Finally, fertility rate refers to the number of births per 
thousand of female population. Figures are from Chesnais (1986), Mitchell (1992), 
World Bank, Social Indicators of Development (1988, 1989 and 1990), World Tables 
(1989, 1990 and 1991), and United Nations, Statistical Yearbook (1987, 1988), and for 
Spain Nicolau (1989). 
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TABLE 1 
STRUCTURAL CHANGE TESTS: DUMMY VARIABLES 
D13: value 1 from 1820 to 1913, and 0, thereafter. 
D2090: value 0, 1820-1913; 1, 1920-1990. 
D38: value 1, 1820-1938; 0, thereafter. 
D5090: value 0, 1820-1938; 1, 1950-1990. 
D2038: value 0, 1820-1913 and 1950-1990; 1, 1920-1938. 
LnY13= D13*lnY 
LnY38=D38*LnY 
LnY2038=D2038*LnY 
LnN13= D13*lnN 
LnN38=D38*LnN 
LnN2038=D2038*LnN
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TABLE 2 
 
NORMAL VARIATION IN ECONOMIC STRUCTURE WITH THE LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT 
-Predicted Values at Different Income Levels- 
US 1990 $ PPP (G-K) 
 
PROCESSES  1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000 
ACCUMULATION             
Investment (% GDP)             
SAVING 6.5 11.0 13.7 15.6 17.1 18.3 19.3 20.2 21.0 21.6 22.3 22.8 
INVESTMENT 8.3 12.4 14.8 16.5 17.8 18.9 19.8 20.6 21.3 21.9 22.5 23.0 
CAPITAL INFLOW  1.8 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Education (%)             
LITERACY 51.1 65.8 74.3 80.4 85.1 89.0 92.2 95.1 97.6 99.8 101.8 103.6 
SCHOOLING 31.7 41.1 46.6 50.5 53.6 56.1 58.2 60.0 61.6 63.0 64.3 65.5 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION             
Demand (% GDP)             
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION 87.7 80.1 75.7 72.5 70.0 68.0 66.3 64.9 63.6 62.4 61.4 60.4 
GOVT. CONSUMPTION 5.8 8.8 10.6 11.9 12.9 13.7 14.4 14.9 15.5 15.9 16.3 16.7 
Production (% GDP)             
AGRICULTURE  44.6 33.2 26.4 21.7 18.0 15.0 12.4 10.2 8.3 6.5 5.0 3.5 
INDUSTRY 26.4 29.8 31.8 33.2 34.3 35.2 36.0 36.7 37.2 37.8 38.2 38.7 
SERVICES 29.0 37.0 41.8 45.1 47.7 49.8 51.6 53.1 54.5 55.7 56.8 57.8 
Labour Force (%)             
AGRICULTURE  65.7 50.1 41.0 34.6 29.5 25.5 22.0 19.0 16.4 14.0 11.9 9.9 
INDUSTRY 21.1 25.9 28.7 30.6 32.2 33.4 34.5 35.4 36.2 36.9 37.6 38.2 
SERVICES 13.2 24.0 30.3 34.8 38.3 41.1 43.5 45.6 47.4 49.1 50.5 51.9 
Urbanization (%)             
URBAN POPULATION 12.6 22.6 28.5 32.7 35.9 38.5 40.8 42.7 44.4 45.9 47.3 48.6 
Relative Labour Productivity (%)             
AGRICULTURE  68.0 66.2 64.5 62.7 60.9 58.8 56.4 53.7 50.5 46.5 41.6 35.3 
Trade (% GDP)             
EXPORTS OF GOODS 11.6 15.4 17.6 19.1 20.3 21.4 22.2 22.9 23.6 24.1 24.6 25.1 
PRIMARY EXPORTS 11.6 10.9 10.0 9.4 8.9 8.6 8.2 7.9 7.7 7.5 7.3 7.1 
MANUFACTURED EXPORTS 0.0 4.5 7.6 9.7 11.4 12.8 14.0 15.0 15.9 16.6 17.3 18.0 
IMPORTS OF GOODS 10.9 16.0 18.9 21.1 22.7 24.0 25.2 26.2 27.0 27.8 28.5 29.1 
OPENNESS 20.5 31.4 36.5 40.2 43.0 45.4 47.4 49.1 50.6 51.9 53.1 54.2 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION             
BIRTH RATE (o/oo) 33.2 27.7 24.5 22.2 20.4 19.0 17.7 16.7 15.7 14.9 14.1 13.5 
DEATH RATE (o/oo) 22.2 18.6 16.4 14.9 13.7 12.8 11.9 11.2 10.6 10.0 9.5 9.1 
RATE NATURAL INCREASE (o/oo) 11.0 9.1 8.1 7.3 6.7 6.2 5.8 5.5 5.1 4.9 4.6 4.4 
FERTILITY 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 
INFANT MORTALITY (o/oo) 186.8 136.8 107.5 86.7 70.6 57.4 46.3 36.6 28.1 20.5 13.6 7.3 
NET FERTILITY [FERTILITY*[1-INFMORT/1000]] 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 
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TABLE 3 
 
NORMAL VARIATION IN GROWTH ELASTICITIES WITH THE LEVEL OF 
DEVELOPMENT 
-Predicted Values at Different Income Levels- 
US 1990 $ PPP (G-K) 
 
 
Point Elasticities* Discrete Elasticities** 
PROCESSES    
 1000 2000 4000 8000 1000-4000 4000-8000 
ACCUMULATION       
Investment (% GDP)       
SAVING     0.632 0.373 
INVESTMENT 0.71 0.48 0.36 0.29 0.496 0.320 
CAPITAL INFLOW        
Education (%)        
LITERACY 0.41 0.32 0.26 0.22 0.327 0.242 
SCHOOLING 0.43 0.33 0.27 0.23 0.336 0.249 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION       
Demand (% GDP)       
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION -0.13 -0.14 -0.15 -0.17 -0.137 -0.160 
GOVT. CONSUMPTION 0.80 0.50 0.37 0.30 0.518 0.324 
Production (% GDP)       
AGRICULTURE -0.37 -0.50 -0.76 -01.62 -0.520 -1.089 
INDUSTRY 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.165 0.145 
SERVICES 0.40 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.319 0.236 
Labour Force (%)       
AGRICULTURE  -0.34 -0.45 -0.65 -1.18 -0.463 -0.840 
INDUSTRY 0.33 0.27 0.23 0.20 0.268 0.210 
SERVICES 1.18 0.65 0.45 0.34 0.699 0.390 
Urbanization (%)       
URBAN POPULATION 1.15 0.64 0.44 0.34 0.688 0.385 
Trade (% GDP)       
EXPORTS OF GOODS 0.47 0.35 0.28 0.24 0.361 0.262 
PRIMARY EXPORTS - - - - -0.152 -0.251 
MANUFACTURED EXPORTS - 1.67 0.78 0.50 1.639 0.629 
IMPORTS OF GOODS 0.55 0.38 0.28 0.23 0.477 0.312 
OPENNESS 0.62 0.41 0.32 0.26 0.486 0.289 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION       
BIRTH RATE (o/oo) -0.24 -0.29 -0.36 -0.48 -0.290 -0.411 
DEATH RATE (o/oo) -0.24 -0.28 -0.36 -0.47 -0.288 -0.412 
FERTILITY -0.24 -0.28 -0.35 -0.48 -0.285 -0.431 
INFANT MORTALITY (o/oo) -0.39 -0.53 -0.83 -1.97 -0.554 -1.244 
NET FERTILITY  [FERTILITY*[1-INFMORT/1000]] -0.20 -0.23 -0.27 -0.34 -0.220 -0.348 
 
* Computed as ?
? ?
x y
t
t
t t
Y
x,
ln
?
? ?? ? , where ? ? and ? ?  are the coefficients for lineal and 
quadratic terms of income ( Yt ) in the regresssion, and x t  is the predicted value 
corresponding to the level of income at which the elasticity is being computed. 
** Elasticities with respect to GDP per head computed from Table 6 by dividing log differences:  
                                                [Ln XT / X0 / Ln YT / Y0] 
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TABLE 4 
 
PRE-WORLD WAR I 
 
NORMAL VARIATION IN ECONOMIC STRUCTURE WITH THE LEVEL OF 
DEVELOPMENT 
-Predicted Values at Different Income Levels- 
US 1990 $ PPP (G-K) 
 
PROCESSES  1000 1250 1500 1750 2000 2250 2500 2750 3000 3250 3500 4000 
ACCUMULATION             
Investment (% GDP)             
SAVING             
INVESTMENT 8.8 9.5 10.1 10.6 11.1 11.4 11.8 12.1 12.4 12.6 12.9 13.3 
CAPITAL INFLOW              
Education (%)              
LITERACY 33.7 43.1 50.7 57.2 62.8 67.7 72.2 76.2 79.8 83.2 86.3 91.9 
SCHOOLING 28.2 31.9 34.9 37.4 39.6 41.6 43.3 44.9 46.3 47.6 48.8 51.0 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION             
Demand (% GDP)             
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION 84.7 83.8 83.1 82.5 82.0 81.6 81.2 80.8 80.5 80.2 79.9 79.4 
GOVT. CONSUMPTION 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 
Production (% GDP)             
AGRICULTURE  47.9 43.9 40.5 37.7 35.3 33.1 31.2 29.5 27.9 26.4 25.1 22.7 
INDUSTRY 25.5 26.4 27.2 27.8 28.3 28.9 29.3 29.7 30.0 30.4 30.7 31.2 
SERVICES 26.6 29.7 32.3 34.5 36.4 38.0 39.5 40.8 42.1 43.2 44.2 46.1 
Labour Force (%)             
AGRICULTURE  67.6 61.5 56.4 52.2 48.5 45.2 42.3 39.7 37.3 35.1 33.0 29.3 
INDUSTRY 17.4 20.2 22.6 24.5 26.2 27.7 29.0 30.2 31.3 32.3 33.3 35.0 
SERVICES 15.0 18.3 21.0 23.3 25.3 27.1 28.7 30.1 31.4 32.6 33.7 35.7 
Urbanization (%)             
URBAN POPULATION 7.7 12.5 16.4 19.8 22.7 25.3 27.6 29.6 31.5 33.3 34.9 37.8 
Relative Labour Productivity (%)              
AGRICULTURE  70.8 71.3 71.8 72.3 72.8 73.3 73.8 74.3 74.8 75.4 76.0 77.2 
Trade (% GDP)             
EXPORTS OF GOODS 9.8 12.5 14.7 16.6 18.3 19.7 21.0 22.2 23.3 24.3 25.2 26.8 
PRIMARY EXPORTS 9.8 11.1 11.5 11.8 12.1 12.3 12.5 12.7 13.0 13.1 13.3 13.5 
MANUFACTURED EXPORTS 0.0 1.4 3.2 4.8 6.2 7.4 8.5 9.5 10.3 11.2 11.9 13.3 
IMPORTS OF GOODS 6.8 9.9 12.5 14.6 16.4 18.1 19.6 20.9 22.1 23.2 24.2 26.1 
OPENNESS 16.6 22.4 27.2 31.2 34.7 37.8 40.6 43.1 45.4 47.5 49.4 52.9 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION             
BIRTH RATE (o/oo) 34.6 33.3 32.1 31.2 30.4 29.6 29.0 28.4 27.8 27.3 26.9 26.1 
DEATH RATE (o/oo) 24.1 23.3 22.6 22.0 21.5 21.0 20.6 20.3 19.9 19.6 19.3 18.8 
RATE NATURAL INCREASE (o/oo) 10.5 10.0 9.5 9.2 8.9 8.6 8.4 8.1 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.3 
FERTILITY 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.9 
INFANT MORTALITY (o/oo) 194.8 183.4 174.0 166.2 159.3 153.3 147.9 143.0 138.5 134.4 130.6 123.9 
NET FERTILITY [FERTILITY*[1-INFMORT/1000]] 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 
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TABLE 5 
 
PRE-WORLD WAR I 
 
NORMAL VARIATION IN GROWTH ELASTICITIES WITH THE LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT 
-Predicted Values at Different Income Levels- 
US 1990 $ PPP (G-K) 
 
PROCESSES  
Point Elasticities* Discrete 
 Elasticities ** 
 1000 2000 4000 1000-4000 
ACCUMULATION     
Investment (% GDP)     
SAVING    - 
INVESTMENT 0.37 0.29 0.24 0.298 
CAPITAL INFLOW      
Education (%)      
LITERACY 1.24 0.67 0.46 0.724 
SCHOOLING 0.58 0.41 0.32 0.427 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION     
Demand (% GDP)     
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.047 
GOVT. CONSUMPTION 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.147 
Production (% GDP)     
AGRICULTURE  -0.38 -0.52 -0.80 -0.539 
INDUSTRY 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.146 
SERVICES 0.53 0.39 0.31 0.397 
Labour Force (%)     
AGRICULTURE  -0.41 -0.57 -0.94 -0.603 
INDUSTRY 0.72 0.48 0.36 0.504 
SERVICES 1.00 0.59 0.42 0.626 
Urbanization (%)     
URBAN POPULATION 2.82 0.96 0.57 1.148 
Trade (% GDP)     
EXPORTS OF GOODS 1.25 0.67 0.46 0.726 
PRIMARY EXPORTS - - - 0.231 
MANUFACTURED EXPORTS - 1.64 0.77 1.866 
IMPORTS OF GOODS 2.31 0.96 0.60 0.970 
OPENNESS 1.58 0.76 0.50 0.836 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION     
BIRTH RATE (o/oo) -0.18 -0.20 -0.24 -0.203 
DEATH RATE (o/oo) -0.16 -0.18 -0.20 -0.179 
FERTILITY -0.12 -0.14 -0.15 -0.135 
INFANT MORTALITY (o/oo) -0.96 -0.32 -0.41 -0.326 
NET FERTILITY [FERTILITY*[1-INFMORT/1000]] -0.09 -0.09 -0.10 -0.080 
 
* Computed as ?
? ?
x y
t
t
t t
Y
x,
ln
?
? ?? ? , where ? ? and ? ?  are the coefficients for lineal and quadratic terms of 
income ( Yt ) in the regression, and x t  is the predicted value corresponding to the level of income at which the 
elasticity is being computed. 
 
** Elasticities with respect to GDP per head computed from Table 8 by dividing log differences:  
                                         [Ln XT / X0 / Ln YT / Y0 ] 
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APPENDIX 
LIST OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
C/GDP: Private Consumption in current prices as a percentage of GDP. 
UGDP: Domestic Investment in current prices as a percentage of GDP. 
G/GDP: Public Consumption in current prices as a percentage of GDP. 
YAgr/GDP: Output in agriculture in current prices as a percentage of GDP. 
YInd/GDP: Output in industry in current prices as a percentage of GDP. 
YSer/GDP: Output in services in current prices as a percentage of GDP. 
LAgr/L: Labour force in agriculture as a percentage of total labour force. 
LInd/L: Labour force in industry as a percentage of total labour force. 
LSer/L: Labour force in services as a percentage of total labour force. 
Xt/GDP: Exports of goods as a percentage of GDP. 
Mt/GDP: Imports of goods as a percentage of GDP. 
Open: Exports of goods plus imports of goods as a percentage of GDP. 
XInd/GDP: Manufactured exports as a percentage of GDP. 
XPrim/GDP: Primary exports as a percentage of GDP. 
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LIST OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
 
C: Constant term. 
LnY: Log of real per capita, GDP in 1990 US $, PPP. 
(LnY)2: Square of the log of real per capita GDP in 1990 US $, PPP. 
LnN: Log of population. 
(LnN)2: Square of the log of real per capita GDP in 1990 US $, PPP. 
INFL: Net imports (imports-exports of goods) as a share of GDP. 
D13: Value 1 from 1820 to 1913, and 0, thereafter. 
D2038: Value 0 from 1820 to 1913 and from 1950 to 1990, and 1 from 1920 to 1938. 
D5090: Value 0 from 1820 to 1938 and 1 from 1950 to 1990. 
D2090: Value 0 from 1820 to 1913 and 1 from 1920 to 1990. 
D38: Value 1 from 1820 to 1938 and 0, thereafter. 
LnY13: D13 * LnY. 
LnY203S: D2038 * LnY. 
LnY38: D38 * LnY. 
TREND: Time trend dummy. 
LnN13: D13 * LnN. 
LnN38: D38 * LnN. 
LnN2038: D2038 * LnN. 
LnSize:                     Log of each country's extension in squared kilometers. 
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  LIST OF COUNTRIES (1850-1990) 
  Austria  
  Belgium 
  Czechoslovakia, 1913-1938 
  Denmark 
  Finland since 1860 
  France 
  Germany  
  Greece  
  Hungary, 1870-1938 
  Italy, since 1860 
  Netherlands 
  Norway, since 1870 
  Portugal 
  Russia, 1880-1913 
  Spain 
  Sweden  
  Switzerland, since 1880   
  UK  
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TABLE A.1 
 
HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE 
 
(1990 US $ PPP) 
 
 
 DEMAND STRUCTURE 
 SINGLE PATTERN ADJUSTED PATTERN 
 (C/GDP) (I/GDP) (G/GDP) (C/GDP) (I/GDP) (G/GDP) 
C 
 
153.323 
(15.149) 
-28.891 
(-3.789) 
83.579 
(2.620) 
   
LnY -6.801 
(-5.956) 
3.259 
(3.808) 
-18.126 
(-2.514) 
-8.147 
(-8.622) 
3.905 
(5.712) 
-9.913 
(-2.250) 
(LnY)2   1.009 
(2.430) 
  0.578 
(2.233) 
LnN 0.985 
(2.482) 
-0.808 
(-2.569) 
0.370 
(1.369) 
32.610 
(17.787) 
-7.488 
(-5.619) 
 9.468 
(2.351) 
(LnN)2    -1.699 
(-17.750) 
0.382 
(5.455) 
-0.487 
(-2.292) 
INFL 0.307 
(4.348) 
0.299 
(5.393) 
 0.338 
(5.265) 
0.284 
(5.873) 
 
D13    -37.259 
(-3.862) 
33.989 
(4.656) 
 
D2038    -66.099 
(-2.568) 
  
D5090    -9.876 
(-7.386) 
7.811 
(8.040) 
 
D2090      2.518 
(2.727) 
D38 
 
      
LnY13    1.668 
(1.923) 
-1.937 
(-2.967) 
 
LnY2038    12.350 
(3.996) 
-2.017 
(-2.843) 
 
LnY38       
TREND -0.793 
(-5.982) 
0.519 
(5.180) 
0.726 
(8.625) 
  0.485 
(4.502) 
LnN13    2.380 
(3.791) 
-1.884 
(-3.925) 
 
LnN2038   
 
 -3.993 
(-5.148) 
1.864 
(3.100) 
 
LnN38       
LnSize -1.918 
(-4.620) 
1.405 
(4.327) 
-0.434 
(-1.537) 
-0.890 
(-2.482) 
1.277 
(4.732) 
 
R 2  0.740 0.582 0.494 0.785 0.680 0.503 
Nº of obs. 262 265 285 262 265 285 
S.E.Regression 
 
5.597 4.447 3.903 5.085 3.889 3.872 
F-Stat. 149.752 74.592 56.645 87.948 57.249 58.443 
 
 (t-ratios in parentheses)
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TABLE A.2 
 
HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE 
 
(1990 US $ PPP) 
 
 
 SINGLE PATTERN 
  
OUTPUT STRUCTURE 
 
 
LABOUR ALLOCATION 
 
 (YAgr/GDP) (YInd/GDP) (YSer/GDP) (LAgr/L) (LInd/L)  (LSer/L)  
C 476.119 
(8.962) 
-545.224 
(-9.653) 
165.154 
(2.967) 
105.368 
(1.873) 
-342.291 
(-7.865) 
297.843 
(5.361) 
LnY -90.407 
(-7.201) 
126.737 
(9.516) 
-36.257 
(-2.746) 
-26.835 
(-19.134) 
81.886 
(8.030) 
-58.321 
(-5.352) 
(LnY)2 4.232 
(5.768) 
-7.069 
(-9.100) 
2.837 
(3.643) 
 -4.194 
(-6.997) 
4.379 
(6.807) 
LnN  2.304 
(5.838) 
-1.933 
(-4.951) 
25.391 
(2.281) 
3.054 
(7.025) 
-16.915 
(-2.126) 
(LnN)2    -1.433 
(-2.432) 
 0.836 
(2.002) 
INFL -0.272 
(-3.354) 
-0.172 
(-1.944) 
0.466 
(5.289) 
-0.321 
(-3.362) 
 0.254 
(3.356) 
D13       
D2038       
D5090       
D2090       
D38       
LnY13       
LnY2038       
LnY38       
TREND 0.239 
(1.774) 
-0.257 
(-1.768) 
 0.752 
(4.260) 
-0.716 
(-5.858) 
 
LnN13       
LnN2038       
LnN38       
LnSize    2.608 
(4.059) 
-2.773 
(-6.282) 
 
R 2  0.823 0.450 0.679 0.847 0.597 0.836 
Nº of obs. 253 253 252 237 237 236 
S.E. Regression 5.952 6.299 6.307 7.602 6.017 5.601 
F-Stat. 293.871 42.237 133.572 218.891 81.537 241.500 
 
 (t-ratios in parentheses)
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TABLE A.3 
 
HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE 
 
(1990 US $ 1990) 
 
 ADJUSTED PATTERN 
  
OUTPUT STRUCTURE 
 
 
LABOUR ALLOCATION 
 
 (YAgr/GDP) (YInd/GDP) (YSer/GDP) (LAgr/L) (LInd/L)  (LSer/L)  
C    105.368 
(1.873) 
  
LnY -16.309 
(-11.992) 
23.461 
(3.355) 
-12.382 
(-1.538) 
-26.835 
(-19.134) 
30.260 
(3.599) 
-3.654 
(-2.856) 
(LnY)2  -1.058 
(-2.522) 
1.320 
(2.747) 
 -1.108 
(-2.169) 
1.237 
(12.975) 
LnN 31.996 
(14.218) 
-21.593 
(-3.398) 
12.731 
(1.774) 
25.391 
(2.281) 
-24.006 
(-3.375) 
-2.072 
(-3.888) 
(LnN)2 -1.789 
(-16.192) 
1.357 
(4.007) 
-0.778 
(-2.072) 
-1.433 
(-2.432) 
1.424 
(3.804) 
 
INFL -0.380 
(-4.711) 
 0.419 
(4.957) 
-0.321 
(-3.362) 
0.157 
(1.953) 
0.147 
(1.965) 
D13  24.000 
(3.436) 
-47.442 
(-4.133) 
  -15.394 
(-2.153) 
D2038  9.101 
(5.662) 
    
D5090  13.616 
(5.881) 
-7.572 
(-3.125) 
   
D2090 -7.770 
(-4.700) 
   
 
8.029 
(4.748) 
-3.129 
(-2.646) 
D38       
LnY13 -1.937 
(-2.852) 
 3.793 
(3.566) 
 
 
  
LnY2038   1.895 
(1.691) 
   
LnY38       
TREND 0.572 
(2.981) 
-0.892 
(-4.263) 
0.529 
(2.393) 
0.752 
(4.260) 
-1.255 
(-6.627) 
 
LnN13 2.014 
(3.332) 
-2.916 
(-3.965) 
1.699 
(2.224) 
 
 
 1.643 
(2.185) 
LnN2038   -1.807 
(-1.929) 
   
LnN38       
LnSize 1.106 
(2.479) 
  2.608 
(4.059) 
-2.692 
(-5.459) 
 
R 2  0.816 0.507 0.709 0.847 0.569 0.823 
Nº of obs. 253 277 252 237 236 236 
S.E. Regression 6.063 6.171 6.005 7.602 5.924 5.823 
F-Stat 140.983 36.541 56.554 218.891 45.350 183.545 
 
 (t-ratios in parentheses)
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TABLE A.4 
 
HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE 
 
(1990 US $ PPP) 
 
 
 SINGLE PATTERN 
 
  
DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 URBANIZATION 
 BIRTH  
RATE 
DEATH  
RATE 
FERTILITY 
RATE 
NET 
FERTILITY 
RATE 
INFANT 
MORTALITY  
RATE 
SCHOOLING LITERACY  
C 109.860 
(3.336) 
206.986 
(10.978) 
20.390 
(3.395) 
14.366 
(3.974) 
1200.945 
(5.053) 
-146.501 
(-1.611) 
-472.170 
(-3.832) 
-114.948 
(-7.342) 
LnY -30.772 
(-5.011) 
-44.856 
(-9.953) 
-3.465 
(-2.494) 
-0.256 
(-2.667) 
-346.803 
(-7.230) 
107.198 
(6.048) 
286.794 
(11.081) 
13.269 
(10.665) 
(LnY)2 1.628 
(4.510) 
2.563 
(9.551) 
0.179 
(2.251) 
 18.062 
(6.369) 
-5.888 
(-5.596) 
-15.801 
(-10.256) 
 
LnN 13.359 
(2.941) 
1.159 
(7.145) 
 
 
-1.774 
(-2.400) 
122.560 
(3.767) 
-62.769 
(-5.292) 
-145.541 
(-8.644) 
8.142 
(10.038) 
(LnN)2 -0.685 
(-2.860) 
  0.089 
(2.306) 
-5.704 
(-3.313) 
3.273 
(5.214) 
7.420 
(8.352) 
 
INFL 0.129 
(3.124) 
-0.063 
(-1.852) 
0.022 
(3.237) 
0.019 
(3.148) 
-1.093 
(-3.370) 
 -0.423 
(-2.074) 
0.825 
(5.726) 
D13         
D2038         
D5090         
D2090         
D38         
LnY13       
 
  
LnY2038         
LnY38         
TREND -0.690 
(-9.863) 
-0.567 
(-10.107) 
-0.080 
(-5.952) 
-0.063 
(-5.160) 
-5.427 
(-9.755) 
0.906 
(5.347) 
  
LnN13         
LnN2038         
LnN38         
LnSize     -3.736 
(-1.895) 
 -1.919 
(-1.874) 
-3.536 
(-4.056) 
R 2  0.783 0.770 0.625 0.561 0.835 0.594 0.792 0.748 
Nº of obs. 285 291 224 220 278 269 154 117 
S.E. Regression. 3.358 2.770 0.519 0.460 25.679 8.240 10.008 7.757 
F-Stat. 171.972 195.135 94.118 56.884 201.533 79.466 97.977 86.924 
 (t-ratios in parentheses)
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TABLE A.5 
 
HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE 
 
(1990 US $ PPP) 
 
 ADJUSTED PATTERN 
 
  
DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 URBANIZATION 
 BIRTH  
RATE 
DEATH  
RATE 
FERTILITY 
RATE 
NET 
FERTILITY 
RATE 
INFANT 
MORTALITY  
RATE 
SCHOOLING LITERACY  
C       -472.170 
(-3.832) 
-114.949 
(-7.342) 
LnY -2.482 
(-3.855) 
-16.819 
(-4.905) 
1.852 
(21.728) 
1.522 
(17.884) 
-125.464 
(-4.259) 
95.595 
(8.691) 
286.794 
(11.081) 
13.269 
(10.665) 
(LnY)2  0.998 
(4.834) 
-0.130 
(-14.853) 
-0.104 
(-12.398) 
5.971 
(3.427) 
-5.452 
(-8.025) 
-15.801 
(-10.256) 
 
LnN 16.392 
(14.422) 
17.460 
(6.032) 
-0.099 
(-3.349) 
-0.058 
(-2.109) 
161.252 
(6.059) 
-77.983 
(-8.249) 
-145.541 
(-8.644) 
8.142 
(10.038) 
(LnN)2 -0.850 
(-14.045) 
-0.914 
(-5.966) 
  -8.227 
(-5.906) 
4.125 
(8.210) 
7.420 
(8.352) 
 
INFL 0.130 
(3.384) 
-0.073 
(-2.185) 
 0.014 
(2.760) 
-1.195 
(-4.181) 
 -0.423 
(-2.074) 
0.825 
(5.727) 
D13 1.033 
(2.746) 
 0.130 
(2.177) 
  -45.904 
(-3.627) 
  
D2038 -2.565 
(-3.125) 
21.819 
(2.655) 
  191.984 
(2.645) 
-2.753 
(-2.433) 
  
D5090 -27.751 
(-3.776) 
-5.553 
(-5.612) 
  -54.512 
(-6.044) 
   
D2090   -0.788 
(-6.099) 
-0.518 
(-4.297) 
    
D38   
 
      
LnY13  -1.231 
(-4.436) 
  -11.662 
(-4.619) 
5.083.6 
(3.356) 
  
LnY2038  -3.148 
(-3.123) 
  -26.688 
(-3.008) 
   
LnY38 -3.267 
(-3.615) 
  -0.084 
(-5.965) 
-0.091 
(-7.209) 
    
TREND -0.616 
(-5.986) 
-0.296 
(-3.329) 
-0.101 
(-5.436) 
-0.096 
(-5.722) 
-2.601 
(-3.045) 
0.997 
(5.955) 
  
LnN13  1.092 
(4.385) 
  11.632 
(5.088) 
   
LnN2038         
LnN38         
LnSize  0.881 
(4.480) 
   -1.009 
(-1.720) 
-1.919 
(-1.874) 
-3.537 
(-4.056) 
R 2  0.813 0.786 0.764 0.675 0.863 0.629 0.792 0.748 
Nº. of obs.  285 291 245 220 278 269 154 117 
S.E.Regression. 3.115 2.673 0.464 0.396 23.367 7.875 10.008 7.757 
F-Stat. 155.819 97.742 132.962 76.682 176.284 57.881 97.977 86.924 
 
 (t-ratios in parentheses) 
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TABLE A.6 
 
HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE 
 
(1990 US $ PPP) 
 
 SINGLE PATTERN 
 
  
EXTERNAL TRADE 
 
 (Xt/GDP) (Mt/GDP) OPEN (XInd/GDP) Xprim/GDP 
C 117.739 
(2.542) 
138.837 
(2.970) 
277.674 
(2.970) 
-241.242 
(-5.521) 
125.322 
(2.405) 
LnY 8.988 
(7.556) 
8.542 
(7.140) 
17.084 
(7.140) 
10.591 
(8.939) 
19.809 
(2.276) 
(LnY)2     -1.217 
(-2.362) 
LnN -24.329 
(-2.667) 
-27.116 
(-2.967) 
-54.231 
(-2.967) 
43.342 
(4.900) 
-32.507 
(-4.050) 
(LnN)2 1.187 
(2.451) 
1.325 
(2.733) 
2.649 
(2.733) 
-2.263 
(-4.858) 
1.557 
(3.687) 
INFL  
 
0.790 
(9.001) 
0.580 
(3.306) 
 -0.167 
(-2.225) 
D13      
D2038      
D5090      
D2090      
D38      
LnY13      
LnY2038      
LnY38      
TREND -0.517 
(-3.423) 
-0.475 
(-3.141) 
-0.950 
(-3.141) 
-0.581 
(-4.097) 
 
LnN13      
LnN2038      
LnN38      
Ln SIZE -3.645 
(-6.589) 
-3.912 
(-6.974) 
-7.824 
(-6.974) 
-2.746 
(-5.896) 
-2.461 
(-5.796) 
R 2  0.484 0.599 0.525 0.599 0.477 
Nº of obs. 297 295 295 218 216 
S.E. Regression 7.530 7.483 14.965 5.331 4.818 
F-Stat. 56.544 74.087 55.171 65.963 33.709 
 
 (t-ratios in parentheses)
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TABLE A.7 
 
HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT IN EUROPE 
 
(1990 US $ PPP) 
 
  
ADJUSTED PATTERN 
 
  
EXTERNAL TRADE 
 
 (Xt/GDP) (Mt/GDP) OPEN (XInd/GDP) Xprim/GDP 
C     
 
 
LnY 10.429 
(17.638) 
10.664 
(17.553) 
21.212 
(17.568) 
-21.431 
(-3.059) 
37.907 
(5.853) 
(LnY)2    1.778 
(4.235) 
-2.139 
(-5.566) 
LnN -2.192 
(-4.356) 
-2.325 
(-4.559) 
-4.682 
(-4.586) 
17.649 
(2.740) 
-23.668 
(-4.198) 
(LnN)2  
 
 
 
 
 
-0.943 
(-2.850) 
1.076 
(3.657) 
INFL  
 
0.864 
(10.798) 
0.734 
(4.588) 
 -0.210 
(-2.904) 
D13 21.415 
(2.565) 
21.997 
(2.599) 
45.396 
(2.684) 
-1.553 
(-2.149) 
15.177 
(2.098) 
D2038 -7.196 
(-5.565) 
  -3.917 
(-3.182) 
 
D5090 -9.654 
(-6.517) 
-9.852 
(-6.572) 
 18.928 
(2.579) 
 
D2090   -19.305 
(-6.537) 
 -3.935 
(-3.639) 
D38      
LnY13 -2.570 
(-2.621) 
-2.648 
(-2.666) 
-5.454 
(-2.748) 
 -1.650 
(-1.964) 
LnY2038  -0.872 
(-5.422) 
0.648 
(2.286) 
  
LnY38      
TREND  
 
 
 
   
LnN13      
LnN2038      
LnN38    2.595 
(3.499) 
 
LnSize -3.472 
(-8.176) 
-3.475 
(-8.140) 
-6.868 
(-8.075) 
-3.134 
(-7.012) 
-2.386 
(-5.706) 
R 2  0.523 0.625 0.555 0.624 0.502 
Nº of obs. 297 295 295 218 216 
S.E. Regression 7.239 7.236 14.482 5.162 4.703 
F-Stat.  55.134 70.905 53.433 46.110 28.093 
 
 (t-ratios in parentheses) 
 
     
